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Introduction
Unlike interstatewars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Between 1940
and 1990 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas
only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions.1 Instead, most internal wars
ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side. In fact,
groups  ghting civil wars almost always chose to  ght to the  nish unless an outside
power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party agreed to enforce
the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initial
goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not intervene,
these talks usually failed.
The fact that civil wars tend to end on the battle eld poses a startling empirical
puzzle for political scientists and an increasingly onerous problem for policymakers.
Why are domestic enemies unable to negotiate successfully?And what can the inter-
national community do to help end these con icts?
I argue that civil war negotiations rarely end in successful peace settlements be-
cause credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement are almost impossible to
arrange by the combatants themselves. Negotiations do not fail because indivisible
stakes, irreconcilable differences, or high cost tolerances make compromise impos-
sible, as many people argue. They do not fail because bargains cannot be struck.
Adversaries often compromise on the basic issues underlying their con ict, and they
frequently  nd mutually acceptable solutions to their problems. Negotiations fail
because civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider unthinkable. At a
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time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a
contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces
and prepare for peace. But once they lay down their weapons and begin to integrate
their separate assets into a new united state, it becomes almost impossible to either
enforce future cooperation or survive attack. In the end, negotiations fail because
civil war adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms.
Only when an outside enforcer steps in to guarantee the terms do commitments to
disarm and share political power become believable. Only then does cooperation
become possible.
In this article I have two aims. First, I propose a theory of civil war resolution that
rests on reciprocal problems of enforcement and vulnerability rather than on innate
differences, goals, or greed. My purpose is to dispel currently popular notions that
civil wars are either beyond compromise or only amenable to compromise when
accompanied by a military stalemate and exceptionally skilled mediation. Second, I
systematically test current theories against forty-one civil war cases. I conclude by
presenting the conditions under which negotiated solutions, once reached, can be
implemented and maintained and the crucial role that outside interventioncan play in
resolving these con icts.
The  rst section of this article presents a theory of civil war termination: domestic
adversaries rarely settle off the battle eld because any attempt to end a civil war will
also eliminate any self-enforcing strategies to maintain the peace. The second section
explores four alternative theories that focus on high costs, indivisible stakes, bargain-
ing problems, and group identity as the key variables affecting resolution. The third
section explains how cases were selected and coded and outlines the steps taken to
test the competing hypotheses. The fourth section interprets the  ndings and dis-
cusses what they suggest about foreign involvement in internal wars.
The Puzzle
Ending a war is usually difficult. Organizational inertia, tunnel vision, wishful think-
ing, and miscommunication all work against early reconciliation and make coopera-
tion difficult. Once  ghting begins, plans are set in motion and attitudes toward the
enemy become  xed in ways that are not easily reversible.2 Even if opponents agree
to negotiate, they still face the risks and uncertainties of cooperation.Will an oppo-
nent ful ll its side of the agreement? Or will the compromise itself turn out to be an
inherently bad deal?
Despite these obstacles, international wars usually end with some type of explicit
settlement. Civil wars do not. Current explanations claim that power asymmetries,
indivisible stakes, bargaining difficulties, or opposing identities make settlement in
civilwars nearly impossible.But this seems unlikely.Military stalematesoften emerge
in civil wars without prompting negotiations; governments can be shared by more
2. For an in-depth discussion on the difficulties in ending wars, see Ikle 1991.
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than one party; and groups that appear ethnicallyor religiously incompatibledo meet
to discuss alternative solutions to war.
Others argue that groups are stuck in what could be called a game of deadlock;
cooperation is impossible because competing domestic groups will always have op-
posing preferences and interests. But this also seems unlikely. Civil war adversaries
do not always continue to  ght because they cannot arrange compromise settlements.
Between 1940 and 1990 42 percent of civil wars (seventeen out of forty-one) experi-
enced some form of formal peace negotiation, and 94 percent of these cases drafted
at least a cease- re accord.3 In other words, adversaries often attempted very serious
peace talks that then broke down. In short, none of the current explanations identi es
a compelling reason why domestic enemies would forgo negotiations in favor of
potentially lengthy battle eld contests. What follows is an attempt to identify addi-
tional factors that might inhibit successful civil war resolution and cause even prom-
ising negotiations to cycle back into war.
The Theory
What is Different About Civil Wars?
The key difference between interstate and civil war negotiationsis that adversaries in
a civil war cannot retain separate, independent armed forces if they agree to settle
their differences. This difference fundamentally alters incentives to abide by any
peace treaty and makes it almost impossible for groups to cooperate. In the following
section, I argue that groups  ghting civil wars avoid negotiated settlements because
they understand that this would require them to relinquish important fall-back de-
fenses at a time when no neutral police force and no legitimate government exist to
help them enforce the peace. Knowing they will enter a period of intense vulnerabil-
ity, neither side can convince the other that they will nobly resist a treaty’s tempta-
tions or naively ful ll its terms. And so, unable to enforce the agreement or survive
exploitation, they avoid cooperation and continue to  ght.
Interstate CooperationUnderAnarchy Encouragingand thenmaintainingcoopera-
tion under anarchy is not easy. It is especially difficult in ‘‘prisoners’ dilemma’’
situations where both states would bene t from cooperating but would also be far
worse off if they naively cooperated while their opponent exploited their trust.4
States in the international system have devised a number of military and economic
strategies to encourage cooperation even when incentives favor cheating. They can
create early warning systems and sophisticated monitoring and veri cation proce-
dures to check each other’s behavior. They can build military defenses, forge exter-
nal alliances, and set up buffer zones to make aggression more costly. They can also
3. See Table 1.
4. The following are indispensable readings for those interested in the strategic dilemmas associated
with cooperation under anarchy: Jervis 1978 and 1976, especially chap. 3; and Schelling 1966, chap. 6.
For applications of these theories to the causes of war, see Posen 1993, 103–24.
Civil War Settlement 337
use symbiotic trade relationships, side-payments, and economic coercion to enhance
the rewards from cooperation. They can also withhold key resources or use recipro-
cal punishment strategies to ensure that violations are punished. Each of these strate-
gies helps to create binding agreements.
Nonetheless, even the most sophisticated strategies for ensuring compliance are
not foolproof, and states know this. States will, however, often cooperate despite this
risk if they can limit the damage caused by cheating.A surprise attack might renew
the war, but states with strong defenses and active forces would be no worse off than
before the settlement. In fact, states could use this time to refurbish forces and re-
stock supplies and thus increase their security. Under these conditions, the risks of
exploitationare manageableand well worth the potential bene ts of long-termpeace.
DomesticCooperationUnderAnarchy None of these strategies is available to groups
 ghting civil wars. Although the same anarchic conditionsexist during times of civil
war as those that exist permanently in the international system—no central govern-
ment exists to insure order, no police or judicial system remains to enforce contracts,
and groups have divided into independent armed camps—the pernicious effects of
anarchy are actually far more severe. Whereas interstate opponents can augment the
bene ts of cooperation and sharpen punishments for cheating, civil war adversaries
have little ability to do so. If they wish to cooperate, these groupsmust disband their
forces and, in so doing, relinquish their only remaining means for protection. Even
states that surrender unconditionallyare rarely required to go so far.5
Thus the single most detrimental condition operating against cooperation is that
civil war adversaries cannot maintain independent armed forces if they decide to
reconcile. Once they sign a peace treaty they cannot retreat to their own borders and
defensively reinforce their militaries, they do not become trading partners or impor-
tant allies, and they cannot hide behind buffer zones. Only if they are willing to
relinquish control over occupied regions, vital industries, and independent military
organizations is a cooperative peace agreement possible.
This situation forces governments and rebels into a paradoxical and unfortunate
dilemma. Any attempt to end a civil war and unify the country also eliminates any
ability to enforce and ensure the peace. Thus, the only way enemies in a civil war can
prematurely end the bloodshed is to force themselves through a transition period
during which they can neither encourage cooperation nor survive attack. They must
weather a period of extreme vulnerability. Civil war rivals, therefore, are damned if
they do and damned if they don’t. As soon as they comply with a peace treaty they
become powerless to enforce the terms over which they had bargained so hard.
The fact that settlement can leave a group far worse off than it would have been
had it simply continued to  ght has two devastating effects on cooperation. First, it
discredits any promise to abide by the terms of an agreement even if offered in good
5. Even mandatory force reductions usually included in international peace treaties do not leave the
adversaries defenseless.
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faith, and, second, it increases groups’ anxiety about future security and makes them
hypersensitive to even the smallest treaty violation.
The result? In most cases the government and the rebels will recognize the over-
whelming risks involved with compliance, and they will refuse to sign any treaty
even if all the underlying issues have been resolved and even if both sides sincerely
want peace. If they do sign, this fear and insecurity will become so overwhelming
that even satisfactory settlements will slowly unravel. In his 1949 report on China,
Dean Acheson keenly observed that ‘‘[t]he distrust of the leaders of both the Nation-
alist and Communist Parties for each other proved too deep-seated to permit  nal
agreement, notwithstanding temporary truces and apparently promising negotia-
tions.’’6 Since each side understands the pro ts to be gained by exploiting a peace
treaty (and both sides know that their opponent also recognizes this opportunity),
their promises to honor and respect the terms of the agreement cannot be trusted.
Under these conditions,  ghting suddenly appears far more appealing than settle-
ment.
In the end, negotiated settlements in civil wars perish under their own unique
demands. Incumbent governments and rebels cannot structure the agreement so that
it will, at worst, allow each side to return as close as possible to the status quo should
one party decide to cheat. And as long as both factions understand that cooperation
will leave them vulnerable and they have no means to avoid this condition, they will
prefer to continue  ghting rather than risk possible attack.
But could more stable, less risky transitions be designed by the participants them-
selves? For example, if the government and the rebels fear a one-step advantage,
could military integration occur in a step-by-step or reciprocal fashion? Or, if one
side enjoys a preponderance of military power and its opponent enjoys a preponder-
ance of political support (like the Kuomintang and the Communists in China), could
these opposing strengths deter the breakdown of a settlement? And  nally, could
groups agree to remain armed until all obtained some real control over new govern-
ment institutions and national security forces? This would impart some protection
until more appropriate institutional checks and balances could be established.
Stable, less risky transitions cannot be designed by the participants themselves for
three reasons that are tied to problems of credible commitment.7 First, groups will
have great difficulty convincing each other to fully execute any plan that eventually
requires them to disarm. Although numerous implementation plans can be designed
to reduce vulnerability, in the end even the most incremental and impartial one will
require the full demobilization of partisan groups. In civil wars, disarmament can be
postponed, and it can be done gradually and in a reciprocal manner, but it can never
be avoided. And as long as a threshold exists beyond which unilateral defense is
6. ‘‘Dean Acheson’s July 30, 1949, Letter of Transmittal to President Truman, The China White Paper,
Department of State Publication 3573,’’ Far Eastern Series 30 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1949), xv.
7. The problem of credible commitment is not new in the international relations literature. For other
discussions related to ethnic con ict, see Fearon 1993;Weingast 1994; Fearon 1995; and Lake and Roth-
child 1996.
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impossible, and both groups realize that an opponent need only wait for this time to
attack, they will either avoid compliance altogether or simply renege on further ful-
 llment at the  rst sign of default. Second, groups will also have great difficulty
convincing each other to accept any plan that offers even the slightest chance of
annihilation.8A95 percent risk-free disarmament planmight appear perfectly accept-
able on paper, but to the groups involved, even a slight chance of an attack is often
too high. In situations of extreme vulnerability, the beliefs groups have about their
own safety and their perception of threat matter as much if not more than the actual
invulnerability of the treaty design. Finally, groups will also have a difficult time
using new institutions to project a credible promise of either effective protection or
neutral enforcement during the transition. These institutions are new and untested.
They are often designed by ‘‘democratic novices’’—people inexperiencedwithmulti-
party political systems, opposition groups, and peaceful transfers of power. More-
over, these institutionswill initially be staffed by former government and rebel offi-
cials with lingering partisan loyalties. These institutions might eventually serve
to reassure groups that their rights and liberties will be protected, but when new,
they could just as well be used as instruments for further repression. Reassuring they
are not.
The Importance of Third-Party Guarantees Third-party guarantors can change the
level of fear and insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facili-
tate settlement. An important and frequent reason why opponents fail to reach suc-
cessful settlements is because they cannot credibly commit to an agreement that will
become far less attractive once implemented. Third parties, however, can guarantee
that groups will be protected, terms will be ful lled, and promises will be kept (or at
least they can ensure that groups will survive until a new government and a new
national military is formed). In short, they can ensure that the payoffs from cheating
on a civil war agreement no longer exceed the payoffs from faithfully executing its
terms. Once cheating becomes difficult and costly, promises to cooperate gain cred-
ibility and cooperation becomes more likely.
But how does one ensure that promises made by a third party at the negotiating
table are themselves credible? To be credible, a guarantee must ful ll at least three
basic conditions. First, the outside state must have a self-interest in upholding its
promise.9 Old colonial ties, strategic interests, economic investments, or alliance
loyalties will enhance any commitment to intervene and will indicate the political
will to persevere. Second, the guarantormust be willing to use force if necessary, and
its military capabilitiesmust be sufficient to punishwhichever side violates the treaty.
Syria could occupy Lebanon, Britain overshadowed Zimbabwe, Ethiopia dwarfed
Sudan, and theUnited States could restrain theDominicanRepublic. Equal or greater
force is necessary for any threat to effectively deter cheating. Third, the intervening
8. For an excellent discussion of the problem of intense vulnerability on cooperation, see Weingast
1994.
9. See Touval and Zartman 1985, 258–60.
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state should be able to signal resolve. The outside power can either station sufficient
forces to deter aggression without having to send for additional forces if con ict
breaks out, as Syria did in Lebanon. Or it can create some type of military trip wire,
as Britain did in Zimbabwe. Outside forces can also be placed at strategically impor-
tant locations, such as troop assembly areas, borders, or munitions sites, and guaran-
tors can have pre-approval from home governments for further action. These costly
signals should allow states to reveal their true preferences and enhance the credibility
of their promises.10
The credible-commitment theory of civil war resolution, therefore, offers us our
 rst hypothesis for testing.Given the reciprocal problems of enforcement and vulner-
ability, hypothesis 1 predicts that the more willing an outside power is to guarantee
the safety of the adversaries during the critical implementationphase, the more likely
domestic opponents are to reach and execute a  nal deal.11 If no such guarantee
exists, civil wars should either fail to reach a settlement or such settlements should
quickly break down. Seen in this light, it becomes clear why Sudan’s Anya Nya
rebels delayed signing the Addis Ababa agreement until Ethiopian Emperor Haile
Selassie personally guaranteed their safety during its implementation. It also ex-
plains why the UNITA rebels in Angola refused to ‘‘start demobilising [their] troops
until a 12,000-strong UN peacekeeping force was in place.’’12 The consequences of
being duped were too great to risk.
Alternative Explanations for Why Civil Wars End Decisively
Few alternative explanations exist for why civil wars tend to end decisively. Civil
war termination, for the most part, is not viewed as an independent puzzle in need of
explanation.Most scholars have either ignored the entire topic of civil war resolution
or have argued that civil wars are largely irreconcilable and therefore uninteresting to
study from a war termination perspective. Compromise has been seen as virtually
impossible.
The discrepancy between civil and interstatewar resolution, however, has recently
attracted the attention of a number of scholars.Althoughmost authorsmix and match
explanatory variables, their theories can be broken down into two basic schools. The
rationalist school believes that enemies in civil wars are driven by the same cost
calculations as their interstate peers but are plagued with special problems that make
agreement difficult.13 The ideational school, on the other hand, views civil wars as
uniquely emotional and value-laden con icts that naturally shun compromise.14
10. For discussions on signalling see Fearon 1994; Jervis 1989, especially chap. 4; and Kydd 1996.
11. This is not to say that outside guarantees can end a war that the combatants have no desire to end. If
continued  ghting is more favorable than the terms of any possible peace settlement, an outside guarantee
will not alter the cost and bene ts enough to convince the opponents to cooperate. Outside guarantees will
only be effective in cases where the adversaries are themselves seeking an alternative to continued war.
12. ‘‘Talks End,War Goes On,’’The Economist, 29 May 1993, 45.
13. See Mason and Fett 1996;Wagner 1993; Zartman 1993; and Holl 1993.
14. See Randle 1973, especially 430; Horowitz 1985, especially chap. 14; and Burton 1987b.
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Rationalist explanations argue that domestic opponents will make the same cost-
bene t calculations that independent states do before agreeing to sign a peace treaty.
They will carefully estimate their chances of winning, the amount of time it will take
to achieve this victory, how much it will cost, and their relative payoff from winning
versus accepting a settlement. In other words, domestic groupswill only settle if they
believe they could do no better by either continuing to  ght or continuing to bargain.
But if domestic adversaries make the same cost calculations as their interstate
counterparts, why do fewer negotiated settlements occur in civil wars? Three pos-
sible explanationsare offered to explain this discrepancy.The  rst variant argues that
negotiated settlements are so rare because the bene ts of winning a civil war are so
much greater.15Adecisivewin would not only give the victor full control of the state,
it would also permanently eliminate a rival for limited resources. Decisive victory,
therefore, offers both immediate and long-term returns for which adversaries are
willing to incur far greater costs.As Jane Holl has argued, ‘‘The intensity or duration
of combat may be excessive because belligerents value the shape of the settlement
more than the costs of disagreement.’’16
Supporters of the second variant argue that domestic stakes are either difficult or
impossible to divide, and this makes a shared settlement infeasible.17 Fighting until
the end is more likely in civil wars because only one legitimate government and one
legitimate military force can exist at any one time. ‘‘If,’’ as Fred Ikle argues, ‘‘parti-
tion is not a feasible outcome because the belligerents are not geographically sepa-
rable, one side has to get all, or nearly so, since there cannot be two governments
ruling over one country, and since the passions aroused and the political cleavages
opened render a sharing of power unworkable.’’18
The  nal rationalist approach emphasizes the difficulties in reaching a mutually
acceptable bargain in wars where barriers to negotiation are high and bargaining
problems particularly exacting. These explanations argue that extremist demands,
ambitious leaders, poor communication, fear, and erratic outside aid limit the range
of tolerable solutions and make mutually acceptable bargains difficult to locate. The
trick is to  nd terms agreeable to both parties under what are always difficult bargain-
ing conditions. Supporters argue that ‘‘an extremely subtle and sensitive approach’’
is often required to overcome these problems, and they identify mediation as the
key to success. If a highly skilled problem solver emerges to help overcome these
pitfalls, talks will succeed.19 If a deft mediator cannot assist, negotiationswill most
likely fail.
Three hypotheses can be drawn from the preceding arguments. The  rst (hypoth-
esis 2) predicts that successful settlements should be more likely as the expected
costs of winning a war increase. Hypothesis 3 predicts that adversaries are more
15. See Mitchell 1991;Assefa 1987; Stedman 1991; and Zartman 1989 and 1993.
16. Holl 1993, 277.
17. See Pillar 1983, 24; Ikle 1991, 95; Holl 1993, 275; Modelski 1964; and Bell 1972, 218.
18. Ikle 1991, 95.
19. Assefa 1987,29. See also Stedman 1991, 23–24;Modelski 1964, 143;Assefa 1987, 17–29;Zartman
1989; Rothchild and Hartzell 1993; Low 1985.
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likely to settle in wars where the stakes are easy to divide, such as in secessionist
wars where groups demand territory and not state control. Hypothesis 4 predicts that
the greater the skill of the mediator, the greater the likelihood for successful settle-
ment.
Scholars in the ideational school see things differently. Internal con icts, in their
view, are far less rationally motivated than wars between independent states. Unlike
interstate struggles that are often driven by greed or a desire for dominance, civil
wars are seen as intense value con icts fought over issues closer to the heart. Domes-
tic con icts are believed to ‘‘involve deep issues of ethnic and cultural identity, of
recognition, and of participation that are usually denied to ethnic minorities, in addi-
tion to . . . other values that are not negotiable.’’20 Compromise is more difficult
under these conditions because groups often cannot  nd common ground. Hypoth-
esis 5, therefore, predicts that wars fought over issues tied to the identity of the
participantswould be more difficult to resolve than those fought over more malleable
political or economic issues.
Data
Cases
I tested these competing hypothesesagainst every civil war between 1940 and 1990.21
Cases were selected based on the coding criteria proposed by J. David Singer and
Melvin Small’s Correlates of War project. To be included in the set of all
civil wars a con ict had to (1) generate at least one thousand battle deaths per year,
(2) occur within a generally recognized boundary, (3) involve the national govern-
ment as a principal agent, and (4) experience effective resistance from both the rebels
and the government.22 These cases are listed in Table 1.
The forty-one civil wars that met these criteria were then further distinguished by
two questions: (1) Did negotiations occur during the war? (2) Did these negotiations
then end in a successful settlement or did the war continue until either the govern-
ment or the rebels won a decisive victory? This distinctionwas made to differentiate
20. Burton 1987a.
21. The  fty-year time span was chosen in order to include a large enough set of cases to apply
statistical analysis. It was bounded in 1990 to determine whether or not settlements would last at least  ve
years.
22. Critics of Singer and Small’s dataset have argued that their coding criteria are excessively broad
(see Pillar 1983; Stedman 1991; and Licklider 1993).As a result, many small-scale confrontations, such as
riots or coups, are included that do not merit the more momentous ‘‘civil war’’ status. To account for this
criticism two case lists were constructed for testing: one generated by Singer and Small’s broad de nition
of civil war and one that excluded any borderline cases. Cases with fewer than  fteen hundred total battle
deaths (such as Guatemala in 1954 and 1970–71, and Indonesia in 1953) or con icts restricted to a very
small percentage of the population (power struggles within the military or a purge within the government)
were dropped. The competing hypotheses were then tested against both lists. Since no signi cant differ-
ences were found between the two case lists, the broader list was used in all subsequent analysis. Border-
line cases are indicated in Table 1 with a superscript ‘‘b’’.
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those wars where the combatants actively pursued a settlement from those where at
least one combatant appeared unwilling to  nd a middle ground.
A war was coded as having experienced negotiations if both sides had enough
bargaining power to elicit important concessions from each other, if factions actually
held face-to-face talks, if issues relevant to resolving the war were discussed, and if
talks appeared to be undertaken in good faith. These quali cations eliminated sched-
uled talks that never took place, meetings where no substantive issues were dis-
cussed, and talks that excluded key participants in the war. Attempts were also made
to exclude meetings undertaken in bad faith.23 A readiness to accept supervision,
public announcements of important concessions, a desire to discuss the details of a
transfer of power, and long-term participation in lengthy negotiations all generated
costs to the rivals and indicated more than a tactical interest in appearing coopera-
tive. This quali cation helped exclude bogus meetings where delegates refused to
talk to each other, set ridiculous preconditions, stalled for time, or feigned interest.
Picking only those talks that had any chance for success ensured a tough test of the
hypotheses; the more likely talks were to succeed on their own, the less likely it was
that high costs, mediation, or outside guarantees had any independent effect on the
outcome.
A distinctionwas also made between negotiations that took place between relative
equals and those negotiations that occurred after one side essentially won the war.
Although bargaining did sometimes occur even when one side accepted defeat, as it
did between King Hussein and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1970, such
one-sided talks could not fairly be classi ed as negotiations aimed at ending a war
short of conquest. If one side had essentially lost, and discussions were merely over
when and how the other side would take over, such talks were not classi ed as
negotiations.
Civil wars were then classi ed according to outcome. Did the war end decisively,
or did it end with some form of successful compromise solution?A war was de ned
as a ‘‘decisive victory’’ if one side could convince its opponent(s) to cease  ghting
without demanding any major concessions in return. Although it is fairly common
that even decisive military victories end with some form of ‘‘negotiated’’ agreement,
an important distinction was once again made between contests that ended with an
agreement negotiated by groups with sufficient strength to continue organized mili-
tary resistance and an agreement that was imposed with little discussion or modi ca-
tion by one side or the other, and only the former were classi ed as true ‘‘negotia-
tions.’’
Successful settlements, therefore, were coded on the basis of three criteria. First, a
treaty had to be jointly drafted by all combatants through give-and-take bargaining.24
23. This was sometimes difficult to determine since belligerents often tried to appear in exible during
discussions ostensibly to maximize any bargaining power. This could explain why participants in so many
cases stubbornly asserted that they would never compromise, only to agree to major concessions later.
Certain actions, however, did help reveal whether or not the participants sincerely wished to cooperate.
24. The  nal product could be written or tacit. In rare cases, such as Yemen, 1970, warring factions
bargained for and agreed to very speci c political and military arrangements that remained strictly verbal.
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Once again, this did not include agreements signed by both parties that were only the
 nal part of the war termination process. These ‘‘settlements’’ were more aptly de-
 ned as capitulationsor surrenders, not as substantive agreements over future politi-
cal and military arrangements.25 Second, the agreement had to keep the opposition
intact as a bargaining entity. Third, it had to end the war for at least  ve years.26 If a
formal peace treaty was signed but broke down within this time period, it was consid-
ered a failed attempt, and the outcome in these cases was coded on the basis of the
eventual military results. Although peace treaties were signed in Uganda (December
1985), Laos (February 1973), Vietnam (January 1973), Jordan (September 1970),
Greece (February 1945), China (January-February 1946), and Chad (March 1979
and August 1979), the terms were either never implemented or only partially imple-
mented, and all broke down within a year. All eventually ended in a decisive victory
for either the government or the rebels. Requiring a peace treaty to last at least  ve
years ensured that only those settlements with lasting effects were coded as success-
ful. This coding was then checked against those presented by Roy Licklider, Hugh
Miall, and Paul Pillar in their datasets.27 Table 1 lists all the wars included in the
study and their eventual outcome.28
Coding the Hypotheses29
Since civil wars can end either in a decisive victory or in a bargained treaty, the
dependent variable in each case was coded dichotomously as either decisive victory
or successful settlement.30
The independent variables were coded as follows. Hypothesis 1 posited that suc-
cessful negotiations to civil wars would vary directly with the strength of outside
security guarantees. Third-party security guarantees were de ned as any implicit or
explicit promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries during the treaty
implementationperiod.31 Such guaranteeswere then broken down into three levels of
strength: weak, moderate, or strong.A guarantee was coded as ‘‘weak’’ if it included
25. It would bemisleading and inaccurate to include these cases as successfully negotiated settlements.
26. A  ve-year measure was chosen to see if a settlement would survive the  rst general election. It is
also the most widely used indicator in the literature. This stipulation excluded some recent, well-
publicized wars, such as Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Bosnia, whose peace treaties have not
yet met the  ve-year durability standard. If robust, the  ndings should still apply to these cases.
27. Licklider 1995;Miall 1992; and Pillar 1983.
28. The full dataset has not been reprinted due to space restrictions but is available to other scholars
from the author.
29. Coding for all variables was made on the basis of primary and secondary historical sources.
30. I did not distinguish among ‘‘successful settlement,’’ ‘‘failed settlement,’’ and ‘‘decisive victory’’
because failed settlements eventually ended in a decisive victory for one group or the other.
31. Promises did not always have to be voiced explicitly.No one questioned the United States’mission
in Lebanon in 1958 when approximately fourteen thousand U.S. troops were stationed there, or Syria’s
resoluteness in 1976 when it sent a ‘‘deterrent’’ force of thirty thousand to Lebanon. Such an enormous
commitment of troops was considered a credible threat to act even if the rules of engagement remained
vague.
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Table 1. Civil wars ending 1940–90
Civil war Negotiations Outcome
1. China (1946–49)a Yes Decisive victory (rebels)
2. Paraguay (1947) No Decisive victory (government)
3. Greece (1944–49)a Yes Decisive victory (government)
4. Yemen (1948)b No Decisive victory (rebels)
5. Costa Rica (1948) No Decisive victory (rebels)
6. Colombia (1948–58)a, c Yes Settlement succeeded
7. Burma (1948–51) No Decisive victory (government)
8. Indonesia (1950) No Decisive victory (government)
9. Philippines (1950–52) No Decisive victory (government)
10. Bolivia (1952)b No Decisive victory (rebels)
11. Indonesia (1953)b No Decisive victory (government)
12. Guatemala (1954)b No Decisive victory (rebels)
13. Argentina (1955)b No Decisive victory (rebels)
14. Indonesia (1956–60) No Decisive victory (government)
15. Lebanon (1958) a Yes Settlement succeeded
16. Cuba (1958–59) No Decisive victory (rebels)
17. Iraq (1959)b No Decisive victory (government)
18. Vietnam (1960–75)a Yes Decisive victory (rebels)
19. Congo (1960–65) No Decisive victory (government)
20. Laos (1960–75)a Yes Decisive victory (rebels)
21. Algeria (1962–63)b No Decisive victory (rebels)
22. Yemen (1962–70)a Yes Settlement succeeded
23. Sudan (1963–72)a Yes Settlement succeeded
24. Rwanda (1963–64) No Decisive victory (government)
25. Dominican Rep. (1965)a Yes Settlement succeeded
26. Uganda (1966)b No Decisive victory (government)
27. China (1967–68)b No Decisive victory (government)
28. Nigeria (1967–70)a Yes Decisive victory (government)
29. Cambodia (1970–75) No Decisive victory (rebels)
30. Jordan (1970)a Yes Decisive victory (government)
31. Guatemala (1970–71)b No Decisive victory(government)
32. Pakistan (1971) No Decisive victory (rebels)
33. Sri Lanka (1971) No Decisive victory (government)
35. Rhodesia (1972–79)a Yes Settlement succeeded
36. Lebanon (1975–76)a Yes Settlement succeeded
37. Iran (1978–79) No Decisive victory (rebels)
38. Nicaragua (1978–79)a Yes Decisive victory (rebels)
39. Uganda (1981–87)d Yes Decisive victory (rebels)
40. Chad (1979–87)a Yes Decisive victory (rebels)
41. Nicaragua (1981–89)a Yes Settlement succeeded
aWars in which negotiations were attempted.
bBorderline cases (small-scale confrontationswith less than  fteen hundred battle deaths).
cThe civil wars in Colombia and in Laos were broken into two phases by Singer and Small.
dThe civil wars in Uganda, Chad, and Nicaragua were not included in the Singer and Small dataset
since they occurred after the study ended in 1980.
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only a formal promise to intervene should the treaty break down.Although no ground
forces were required, this promise had to be offered publicly during formal negotia-
tions by the leader of the guarantor state or his or her direct emissary. In other words,
the promise had to be widely known and could not be recanted without negative
reputational effects on the leader. A ‘‘moderate guarantee’’ required the deployment
of at least  ve hundred soldiers prior to the implementationperiod.Although insuffi-
cient to pacify an aggressive attack, this commitmentwas seen as a credible deterrent
given the visibility of the endorsement. An early withdrawal was viewed as poten-
tially costly to the guarantor since it could severely damage ‘‘credibilitywith friends
and allies,’’ as President Clinton himself admitted when pressured to withdraw from
Somalia.32 Finally, a promise was coded as a ‘‘strong guarantee’’ if an outside state
sent massive ground forces (at least ten thousand) to the beleaguered country. This
was viewed as an unambiguous and indisputable demonstration of intent.33
The most popular hypothesis, hypothesis 2, claimed that opponentswere increas-
ingly likely to settle as the expectedcosts of achievingvictory increased.This hypoth-
esis was measured using four indicators: the duration of war, the presence of a mili-
tary stalemate, the magnitude of war (measured in battle deaths per one thousand
population), and the intensity of the war (measured in battle deaths per month).34
These indicators were seen as good yardsticks since domestic factions adjust their
estimates on the likely costs of war as they obtain new information on the progress of
battle. The duration of war, the number of battle deaths per population, and the
number of battle deaths per month indicate how costly war has been and provide
important information about what may lie ahead. The presence or absence of a mili-
tary stalemate allows groups to estimate how long it might take before one side or the
other could prevail on the battle eld. A military stalemate would indicate a balance
of power between the competing groups and promise a long  ght.
But how do you de ne ‘‘military stalemate’’? As Licklider so aptly stated, ‘‘Zart-
man’s concept of the ‘hurting stalemate’ is deceptively hard to work with. . . . The
concept is difficult to operationalize without being tautological.’’35 The best de ni-
tion I can offer is a situation where neither combatant is able to make noteworthy
advances on the battle eld due to the strength of the opposing side, and neither side
believes that the situation will improve in the near future.36 Although none of these
measures is a perfect predictor of the future costs of war, taken together they should
provide a fairly good estimate of group perceptions of the costs and bene ts of
continuing to  ght.
32. New York Times, 8 October 1993,A15, quoted in Mercer 1996, 4–5.
33. Suchmassive involvementdoes somewhat muddy thewaters between negotiated settlements reached
by the parties themselves and settlements imposed by outside force. Massive ground forces were coded as
a guarantee, however, if they brought peace to an otherwise war-torn state.
34. The measures for both ‘‘magnitude’’ and ‘‘intensity’’ were taken from the Correlates of War data-
base. See Small and Singer 1982.
35. Licklider 1993, 309.
36. A similar de nition is offered by Licklider 1993. The selection of cases was then checked against
standard historical accounts. If disagreement arose, I deferred to the historical consensus.
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Hypothesis 3 predicted that the easier the stakes were to divide, the more likely
opponentswere to reach a settlement. ‘‘Divisibility’’ was  rst measured by identify-
ing the goals of the combatants and then coding a con ict as ‘‘separatist’’ or ‘‘non-
separatist.’’ A war was coded as separatist if a faction attempted to split from the
original territory and create a new state or if it aimed to obtain greater regional
autonomy. The widespread rebellions in Sumatra, Java, and the Moluccans in 1953,
for example, were coded as separatist movements since rebel leaders sought greater
home rule and a larger share of the national revenue, not political control. If the
factions simply wanted to take over the existing government, the con ict was coded
as nonseparatist. Separatist demands for territory were expected to be easier to meet
than nonseparatist demands for state control and thus more likely to reach successful
settlements.
Measuring ‘‘divisibility’’ using the goals of the belligerents, however, could be
problematic. Separatist groups often have unrealistic demands that the government
cannot satisfy without hurting the state’s survival as a political entity. Secessionists
might demand portions of territory that include most if not all of the valuable re-
sources within the original state or demand self-determination in an already tenuous
multiethnic state. Compromise under these conditions might be viewed as self-
destructive by the government and therefore unacceptable at any cost—not necessar-
ily the best indicator of a government’s desire to compromise in general.
A second measure of ‘‘divisibility’’ was therefore constructed based on the distri-
bution of population and resources within each state, in other words, based on how
easy it would be to actually divide the state. Division was considered ‘‘easy’’ if the
 ghting factions occupied distinct regions of the country and the resources were
distributed fairly equally among them. The war between East and West Pakistan in
1971 and the rebellions in the Indonesian islands in the 1950s were wars where the
stakes could have been easily divided. Division was considered ‘‘impossible’’ if the
populations  ghting the war were indistinguishable because the war was fought for
political or economic reasons rather than ethnic or religious reasons or if the re-
sources were concentrated in a single area occupied by one group. Greece, Colom-
bia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Cambodia, and Laos were some of the cases included in
this group. Divisibility was coded as ‘‘difficult’’ but not impossible if the population
was interspersed together with the resources or if the population was concentrated
into distinct regions with one region possessing most of the resources. Cases where
separation would be easy were once again expected to reach settlement more often
than cases where separation would be difficult, regardless of the original aims of the
competing groups.
Hypothesis 4 had the most difficult variable to operationalize since it argued that
mediation strategies and tactics must be tailored to the speci cs of each case. None-
theless, mediation can be partially tested by simply reporting how often a mediator
was present during negotiations in each war. Given the theory, one would expect all
successful settlements to involve mediation and those that failed to have suffered
from its absence.
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Hypothesis 5 predicted that successful settlements would emerge less often in
wars fought between competing identity groups. If a war broke down along ethnic or
religious lines, it was considered to involve issues of identity and was coded as either
‘‘ethnic’’ or ‘‘religious.’’ All other wars were coded as ‘‘nonidentity’’ con icts. Eth-
nic or religiouswars were expected to be far more difficult to resolve since the issues
separating the warring parties would not disappear through any type of settlement.
Findings
I created this dataset to answer two questions:Why do civil wars rarely end in lasting
negotiated settlements, and what conditionsultimately lead to negotiated solutions to
these wars? My goal was to see which of the proposed hypotheses could best predict
whether a civil war would end through a negotiated settlement or whether  ghting
would continue until one side or another won a decisive victory. To do this, a simple
Pearson correlation coefficient or cross-tab analysis was used to determine which
variables were most strongly related to settlement and which had little or no effect
(see Table 3, discussed later).37
Overall, the single most successful explanation for why civil war negotiations
failed was the credible-commitment argument.38 Once adversaries agreed to negoti-
ate, every case where a third-party stepped in to guarantee a treaty resulted in a
successful settlement (Table 2 summarizes the methods of resolution for civil wars
with outside security guarantees). Outside powers guaranteed Lebanon’s agreement
in 1958, the Dominican Republic’s ‘‘Act of Dominican Reconciliation,’’ the Riyadh
Agreement in Lebanon (1976), the Addis Ababa Agreement in Sudan (1972), the
Lancaster HouseAgreement in Zimbabwe (1979), and the TelaAgreement in Nicara-
gua (1989), and all brought peace. Only two civil wars reached a successful settle-
ment without an outside guarantee (Colombia in 1958 and Yemen in 1970), and the
details of these two exceptions tend to con rm the rule.
Although Colombia and Yemen did reach settlements without outside guarantees,
they were also the only two wars where the opposing parties could not launch sur-
prise attacks against each other. Both wars were fought by relatively uncommitted
armies whose loyalties could be procured by the highest bidder; the warring parties
themselves did not have organized partisan forces at their command. In Colombia the
37. It should be emphasized that this analysis is based on the universe of all cases of civil wars between
1940 and 1990 and that, because of this, tests of statistical signi cance might be deemed inappropriate. In
other words, one could ask why—if we are looking at the entire universe of nontrivial civil wars and not a
sample of them—we should use a statistical test of signi cance to arbitrarily separate valid hypotheses
from the rest? I have chosen to include statistical signi cance criteria because the inexact nature of the
coding process and the limited time period suggest that not all inferences from the data will be wholly
accurate. Since there is no way of estimating any possible errors in the data, I include conventional tests of
statistical signi cance as a reasonable measure of the validity of each of the hypotheses.
38. These tests were also repeated using a multivariate logit regression. This analysis generally sup-
ported the conclusions of this article, however, the small number of cases caused problems with the logit
estimating procedure. Speci cally, the strong correlation between guarantees and successful settlement
created a null set (there were no cases where security guarantees were offered and the settlement failed),
which the logit estimating procedure had difficulty incorporating.Details of this analysis, therefore, were
excluded from this article.
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national army remained relatively uninvolved in the  ghting and allowed the war to
be fought by small bands of armed peasants. In Yemen, the Royalist rebels had no
regular army. In order to  ght, ‘‘tribal forces had to be assembled by negotiationwith
the shaikhs for each contemplatedoperation of any size.’’39 Thus, once the Conserva-
tives and Liberals in Colombia and the Royalists and Republicans in Yemen agreed
to compromise, they did not have to demobilize and integrate separate, partisan mili-
tary corps. They simply bought the loyalty of either the powerful Colombian gener-
als or theYemeni tribes and in this way obtained fairly neutral forces. In short, these
adversaries could successfully cooperate because they did not need to pass through a
vulnerable demobilization and reintegration period.40
Close scrutiny of the other cases con rmed the strong effect that security fears had
on settlement. In almost every civil war negotiation,  nal deliberations were  lled
with skeptical pronouncements about future security. Nigeria’s Ibo population re-
fused to sign a cease- re agreement because they feared the government would mas-
sacre them, and the government refused to sign because they believed ‘‘that Ojukwu
and his foreign backers will certainly use the cease- re pause to re-arm and prepare
for a bloodier con ict in which more innocent lives will be lost.’’41 Neither side
trusted that the other would honestly abide by the terms.
In case after case belligerentseventuallywalked away from the bargaining table if
an outside power did not step forward to monitor and enforce a peace treaty. When
asked by a reporter if his demand for white control over the police and army during
the transitionwas a make-or-break issue, Ian Smith replied: ‘‘Yes, it is, because if the
African side goes back on this agreement, then we won’t be seeing an interim govern-
ment any time soon.’’42 And when asked if the British had made ‘‘a crucial conces-
39. An excellent account of this war can be found in Stookey 1978, especially 243–45 and 258.
40. Colombia’s Conservative and Liberal parties also settled their differences using a very rigid and
unique power-sharing arrangement. Their agreement called for a 50-50 division of political positions and
an alternating presidency. Each party knew exactly how much political power they would receive. This
also enhanced their sense of future security.
41. Stremlau 1977, 126.
42. Interview with Ian Smith, October 1976, in Baumhoegger 1984, vol. 2, 176.
Table 2. Civil wars with outside security guarantees and their method of resolution
Type of guarantee Decisive victory Successful settlement Row total
No guarantee 33 (94%) 2 (6%) 35 (100%)
Weak guarantee 0 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Moderate guarantee 0 3 (100%) 3 (100%)
Strong guarantee 0 2 (100%) 2 (100%)
Column total 33 (80%) 8 (20%) 41 (100%)
Chi-square 5 10.43; ( p 5 .015).
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sion’’ by stationingBritish and Commonwealth forces in the assembly areas with the
Patriotic Front troops, Robert Mugabe, head of theAfrican rebels, echoed:
Yes. We welcomed that because it was the really vital element and it prevented
the Rhodesian forces, you see, supported by the South African forces—who were
in the country, don’t forget—from attacking our assembly points. There were
nasty incidents here and there. Yes, that was really vital.43
In his words, ‘‘it would be ridiculous for the settlers who are murdering the Zim-
babweans to be intrusted with [our] security during the crucial transitional period.’’44
He made it clear that the Patriotic Front ‘‘would rather prefer Ian Smith having 100
percent representation in Parliament and we having the army controlling, than hav-
ing majority in Parliament with Ian Smith having the army, you see. That’s not trans-
ference of power at all.’’45
Even if an acceptablemilitary settlement was reached (as it was between the Chi-
nese Communists and the National government in 1945), neither side agreed to sign
without some type of outside guarantee. If, however, peacekeeping forces were al-
ready in place but were withdrawn after a settlement was reached, as they were in
Laos after the 1973 cease- re and in Vietnam after the 1975 Paris peace talks,  ght-
ing always resumed shortly thereafter. Since the outside state had no intention of
maintainingany commitment beyond a certain, often declared, date, its military pres-
ence had no positive effect on the success of negotiations. In the end, the ultimate
success of a peace treaty seemed to rest on a third-party’s desire to become involved
and remain involved after a treaty was signed.
The relationship between security guarantees and settlement was clear. It was
more difficult, however, to determine if the strength of a guarantee affected the like-
lihood of success since settlements always succeeded when outside guarantees were
offered. Closer inspection, however, revealed an interesting pattern.Weak guarantees
were generally offered in wars with very high costs and were usually offset by exten-
sive internal power-sharing arrangements. Peace agreements that allowed the indi-
vidual adversaries to retain as much independentstrength as possible—in the form of
political representation, veto powers, and a military balance in the national forces—
required only weak external security guarantees in order to succeed. Conversely,
outside guarantees tended to be strongest in less bloody wars with low costs, and
treaties with vague or undeveloped political arrangements. Peace agreements that
included few political guarantees for future political participation (or only the prom-
ise of elections) and unequal representation of groups in the national army required
the strongest external guarantees in order to succeed. In these cases, the belligerents
seemed far less certain of their own abilities to deter renewed war.
This inverse relationship between the strength of security guarantees and the ex-
tent of postwar internal political and military arrangements becomes clear when the
43. Interview with Mugabe, in Charlton 1990, 130–31.
44. ‘‘Report on R. Mugabe’s Reaction to I. Richard’s New Proposals 12/24/76,’’ in Baumhoegger 1984,
vol. 2, 236.
45. Interview with Mugabe ca. 11–14 May 1977, in Baumhoegger 1984, vol. 3, 328.
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actual treaties are compared. The settlement to end the Sudanese civil war was under-
written by the weakest guarantee of this study. Yet, in this case, Ethiopian Emperor
Haile Selassie’s fairly thin promise to the Sudanese rebels that ‘‘his government was
committed to their security’’ and his personal guarantee that Anya Nya returnees
would not suffer reprisal or repression were supplemented by some of the most de-
tailed federal provisionsof any settlement.46 Unlikemany of the other peace accords,
the Addis Ababa agreement to end the Sudanese war maintained very clear political
and military distinctions between the  ghting factions of the North and South. The
new constitution guaranteed the continued existence of a southern regional govern-
ment and gave theSouth enough tax revenue to survivewithout help from thewealthier
North. More importantly, the accord was able to fashion a national army that pre-
served the armed strength of both factions. Under the terms of the peace accord, the
southern command of the new national army would be equally divided between
officers and soldiers from both the North and the South.47
These detailed and fairly balanced terms can be compared with the very weak
political and military arrangements included in the 1958 and 1976 agreements to end
the two civil wars in Lebanon. The 1958 agreement only arranged for the creation of
a coalition cabinet consisting of two government and two opposition leaders; two
members of the new cabinet would be Muslim and two members would be Christian.
This treaty was backed by fourteen thousand U.S. troops who were stationed on the
ground to ensure that  ghting stopped. The 1976 Lebanese agreement was similarly
weak; it only dealt with ‘‘the military and security aspects of the civil war and made
no reference to the political and religiousdifferences between the opposing Lebanese
factions.’’48 This ‘‘weak’’ treaty was underwritten by an exceptionally strong Arab
‘‘deterrent’’ force.
The three remaining cases with outside guarantees fall somewhere in between
these two extremes. Nicaragua (1989), Zimbabwe (1979), and the DominicanRepub-
lic (1965) all had extensive political and military power-sharing arrangements, and
all were underwritten by moderate guarantees. Nicaragua’s August 1989 Election
Agreement called for free and open democratic elections and promised to create
twenty-three self-governing development zones that the Contras could occupy and
police on their own. These zones comprised 20 percent of the country. Numerous
arrangements were also made to ensure the safest possible demobilization.Demobi-
lization was asserted to be voluntary, and Contras who did not wish to participate
would allegedly not be disturbed. Those who did decide to demobilize could gather
at  ve security zones that would be controlled by ONUCA (United Nations Group in
Central America); all Sandinista security forces would be withdrawn from within
twenty kilometers of these areas. In return, the Sandinistaswere offered an important
military concession. After losing the election to Violeta Chamorro, leader of the
opposition, Daniel Ortega was allowed to retain his position as commander-in-chief
46. Assefa 1987, 140–41.
47. See Wai 1981, 171.
48. Keesing’s ContemporaryArchives, 31 December 1976, 28123.
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of a re-formed army. This promised to safeguard the Sandinistas against renewed
Contra attack.These fairly extensive internal security arrangementswere then supple-
mented by 260 unarmed UN peacekeepers and 800 armed Venezuelan paratroopers.
Zimbabwe had a similar mix of internal and external security arrangements. Black
Zimbabweans were offered one-man, one-vote elections in a country where they
represented 97 percent of the population. In addition, Rhodesian civilians would be
required to surrender their vast private armory of weapons, certain Rhodesian mili-
tary and paramilitary units would be disbanded, a new civil police would be formed,
and white SouthAfrican forces currently stationed in Rhodesiawould not be allowed
to interfere in the transition. Finally, assembly points for demobilizingPatriotic Front
soldierswould be located near their operation areas and far away from the Rhodesian
army bases. This meant that many assembly areas would be located near Mozam-
bique and Zambian borders and thus offer a quick escape should the assembled sol-
diers be attacked. In return, white Rhodesians were guaranteed 20 percent of the
seats in the lower house of Parliament, they were allowed to retain control over the
Rhodesian air force, and South African forces were allowed to remain on Zim-
babwean soil. Most importantly, however, these white settlers were permitted to
retain dual citizenshipwith Britain,which offered them their own quick escape should
they themselves be threatened. Despite these assurances, the Patriotic Front still only
signed the Lancaster House Agreement after Britain agreed to send twelve hundred
Commonwealth forces to Zimbabwe and agreed to station them there until the new
government was established.
In short, a durable settlement, one that will last even after outside forces withdraw,
requires more than temporary police protection. Outside forces are necessary to get
the opponents through the tricky transition period, but an effective long-term equilib-
rium must also be established. Governments and rebels were very concerned with
speci c power-sharing arrangements during negotiations, although these were not
the decisive issues over which negotiations hung. Adversaries were able to enhance
their own sense of security through a number of explicit treaty provisions (such as
constitutionalguarantees, legal protections, and well-balanced security designs). It is
important to remember, however, that even the most extensive internal arrangements
were not enough to completely alleviate the otherwise intense security dilemma. The
Nigerian government promised the Ibos general amnesty, offered them a fair share of
employment in federal public services, and promised that police units in Ibo areas
would consist mostly of persons of Ibo origin, but this did little to reduce Ibo fear of
postwar persecution. Without an external guarantor, this offer had little impact on
negotiations, and it eventually failed to produce a settlement. No matter how brutal
the war or how generous the terms, the two sides could not succeed on their own.
How well did the other theories predict success? Of all the other hypotheses, only
one was able to predict civil war outcomeswith any real consistency.The correlation
coefficients presented in Table 3 show some support for a link between duration,
stalemate, battle deaths per population, and successful settlement. In other words, as
wars becamemore costly, the possibilityof a successful settlement did increase some-
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what. All the other variables—divisibility, mediation, and identity—seemed either
completely unrelated or only very weakly related to the outcome of civil wars.
As illustrated in Table 3, ‘‘costs’’ did seem to in uence civil war outcomes. Longer-
than-average wars were more likely to end in negotiated settlements than were short
wars (r 5 .327; p 5 .042), negotiations were more likely to succeed if a military
stalemate existed on the battle eld (r 5 .381; p 5 .014), and wars with greater than
median battle deaths per population tended to reach successful settlements more
often than those with lower death rates (r 5 .369; p 5 .025). Clearly, these costs
exacted a toll on the population and encouraged their leaders to reconcile. The only
measure of costs that was not closely linked to outcome was intensity (r 5 2 .134;
p 5 .290). More intense wars were no more likely to end in successful settlements
than in decisive victories. One explanationmight be that intensewars represent those
con icts where one side is making rapid military gains and therefore has no reason to
compromise. If this were the case, then very intense wars should actually be nega-
tively correlated with successful settlement. Table 3 does show some support for this
conclusion.
Although the  ndings did offer some support for the cost hypothesis (hypothesis
2), it still could not predict successful settlement as well as outside security guaran-
tees. Duration, stalemate, and battle deaths were clearly related to the outcome of
these wars, but they were certainly not the crucial element in the ultimate outcome of
Table 3. Possible causes of civil war settlement (all forty-one civil wars, 1940–90;
Pearson correlation coeffõcient analysis)
Independent variable
Outcome (victory or settlement)a
r Signicance (p)
Security guarantee .841 .000**
Costs
Duration .327 .042*
Stalemate .381 .014*
Magnitude .369 .025*
Intensity 2 .184 .290
Divisibility
Goals 2 .060 .710
Population/resource distribution 2 .055 .744
Mediation .258 .104
Identity
Ethnic .089 .580
Religious .267 .091
aOutcome is coded 1 for successful negotiated settlement and 0 for decisive victory.All the indepen-
dent variables are coded so that a positive relationship conforms to the hypothesis.
**p , 0.01 (two-tailed).
*p , 0.05.
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the war. Only  ve out of fourteen long wars (35 percent) ended with a successful
settlement, only three out of  ve military stalemates (60 percent) ended in successful
settlement, and only  ve out of eighteen of the more brutal wars (28 percent) ended
in settlement. By contrast, every case with a security guarantee ended successfully.
The data offered little or no support for the other hypotheses. As illustrated in
Table 3, no identi able relationship exists between divisibility and successful settle-
ment, and only a very weak connection exists between mediation and success, and
ethnicity and success; neither of which was statistically signi cant.
Contrary to the predictions of hypothesis 3, neither divisibility nor goals had any
effect on the outcome of a civil war. Separatist wars or wars with easily divisible
stakes were no more likely to reconcile than wars where partition was impossible.
Secessionists settled in only one of seven separatist wars, and in this case the Suda-
nese chose federation rather than territorial partition.The more objectivemeasure of
‘‘divisibility’’ yielded the same results (r 5 2 .055; p 5 .744). Only two of the ten
‘‘highly divisible’’ cases (Sudan and Lebanon) reached a negotiated solution, and,
once again, both rivals chose to maintain the territorial integrity of the original states.
In contrast, four out of the twenty-three cases deemed ‘‘impossible’’ to partition
actually reached a settlement (Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Yemen [1970],
and Nicaragua [1989]).
This  nding leads to an interesting observation. The credible-commitment theory
of civil war resolution implies that partition should be a viable option for adversaries
wishing to settle since it would circumvent the fatal problem of military disengage-
ment. The intense security dilemma that undermines cooperation should not hold in
cases where the combatants retain their armed forces. As we just saw, however,
secessionist movements were no more amenable to successful settlement than were
nonsecessionist wars. Governments rarely allowed sections of their territory to be
lopped off in order to either avoid or shorten civil wars. Why? One could argue that
governments view separation as a decisive victory for the rebels, not as a compro-
mise. Yet governments and rebels should be able to come up with solutions that do
not make it appear as if the government simply capitulated to the secessionist’s de-
mands. The government, for example, could relinquish a portion of the desired terri-
tory in return for economic compensation. In this way, the rebels would obtain their
independencewithout forcing the government to set a precedent for easy accommo-
dation.Perhaps a better explanation is that states reject separation as a viable solution
because their reputation for resolve is intricately tied to their ability to defend and
maintain their territory.49 Once it becomes clear that governments can no longer
defend their own sovereign territory, they become attractive targets for any domestic
or international foe. No government, therefore, can afford to part with territory even
if it would increase the likelihood of ending a long and costly war. In short, although
one would expect groups to embrace partition as an easy way out of domestic con a-
grations, they simply do not view it as a satisfactory alternative to war.
49. This argument would follow from Thomas Schelling’s discussions of reputation; see Schelling
1980, especially chap. 2. I am indebted to Jack Snyder for pointing out this connection.
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The data also showed only a weak link between mediation and successful settle-
ment. Although wars in which a mediator was present were slightly more likely to
end in a successful settlement, the relationship as shown in Table 3 was very weak
(r 5 .258; p 5 .104). Only half of the successful peace treaties even had a mediator
present. Colombia, Lebanon (1958, 1976), and Nicaragua (1989) all reached success-
ful settlementswithout the aid of a direct intermediary, whereas mediators in twenty-
six other attempts failed to reach settlements. Diplomacy might make the bargaining
process less arduous and allow the parties to  nd a solution sooner than otherwise,
but such interventionsdid not affect the actual outcome of war.
But why would so many people insist on the importance of mediation? Two rea-
sons come to mind. First, it is easy to claim that negotiations failed due to poor
mediation and that others succeeded because diplomats expertly pulled all the right
strings. Such post hoc explanations are never wrong. Second, this argument appears
compelling because the appearance of mediators frequently coincides with the offer
of outside security guarantees.Mediators often deliver security guarantees and there-
fore tend to appear in cases where settlements succeed. But by concentrating on
mediation, these explanations have overlooked the real mechanism at work: media-
tors are only as effective as the guarantees their home states are willing to offer. Thus,
the success of the Lancaster House Conference had less to do with Lord Carrington’s
skill, as most people argue,50 than with the treaty guarantees Britain was willing to
extend.
Finally, the supposedly more intransigent ‘‘identity’’ wars also did not act as pre-
dicted. Wars with strong ethnic underpinnings appear to be no more difficult to re-
solve than those fought over nonidentity issues (r 5 .089; p 5 .580). And only very
weak support was offered for the connection between religiouswars and the absence
of settlement (r 5 .267; p 5 .091).51 Contrary to expectations, only 17 percent of the
nonidentity wars ( ve out of twenty-nine) were successfully resolved, whereas a
quarter of the cases (three out of twelve) where ethnicity was a central feature of the
con ict actually found a successful settlement. In short, negotiated solutions to civil
wars occurred between adversaries with very different racial, tribal, and religious
differences; Sudan, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe were all driven by ethnic or religious
issues, yet all ended in compromise.And settlements failed to emerge in wars with no
ethnic or religious underpinnings. These  ndings directly challenge much of the
conventional wisdom that claims that ethnic con icts are somehow averse to settle-
ment and show instead that fear and insecurity can interpose themselves on any
con ict, no matter what the original makeup of the combatants and no matter what
their original grievances.
The ‘‘identity’’ explanation most likely falls short because ethnic and religious
differences emerge in interstate wars and make their agreements equally difficult to
attain. Enemieswill always be demonized and their unique qualitiesportrayed as evil
and barbaric. Yet interstate opponents are able to overcome this hatred. Vital beliefs
50. See Low 1985; Stedman 1991; Davidow 1984; and Vance 1983.
51. Two recent quantitative studies had similar  ndings; see Licklider 1995; and Mason and Fett 1996.
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and emotions are often altered through positive propaganda, economic incentives, or
simple socialization. They also sometimes mellow as other values come to the fore.
As long as identity is used and manipulated to sustain all war movements, it cannot
account for the discrepancy between internationalwar and civil war resolution.
But Does This Really Tell Us All We Need to Know?
A number of challenges can be leveled at these  ndings. Although the evidence
seems to offer clear support for the credible-commitment theory of civil war resolu-
tion, one could argue that guarantees only emerge under the most propitious circum-
stances. Outside states only offer guarantees in those civil wars where negotiations
are already underway and therefore most likely to succeed. If this is true, then the
seemingly powerful correlation between outside security guarantees and successful
settlement could be spurious—merely the result of a selection effect.
Two tests were designed to check whether security guarantees had an independent
effect on adversaries’ decisions to sign and implement treaties. First, the original
dataset was broken down into those civil wars in which negotiationsoccurred during
their term and those in which they did not. The competing hypotheses were then
retested against only those seventeen cases in which negotiationstook place.52 In this
way, variables that were present in all forty-one civil wars (such as identity and
divisibility)would have an equal opportunity to affect the outcome as those variables
present only after negotiationscommenced (such asmediationand guarantees).Would
mediation and security guarantees still vary with the success and failure of negotia-
tions when one looked only at those cases where combatants had already begun to
talk?
In the second test, each of the individual cases in which settlements were reached
was examined in greater detail. If guaranteeswere simply offered in cases that would
have succeeded on their own, domestic adversaries should have signed and imple-
mented agreements as soon as mutually acceptable terms to their underlying griev-
ances were reached. No discussion should be found over the need or desire for out-
side guarantees.
As it turns out, both tests con rmed the strong correlation between outside secu-
rity guarantees and successful settlement. When the seventeen cases with negotia-
tions were analyzed separately three intriguing results appeared. First, as shown in
Table 4, security guarantees were still strongly related to successful outcomes (r 5
52. Why not just analyze this subset of seventeen cases in the  rst place? Testing the competing hypoth-
eses against a smaller subset of cases could have introduced an even more problematic selection bias.
First, excluding civil wars simply because the belligerents did not attempt negotiations would be like
excluding all cases where the dog did not bark. In other words, looking only at those wars where negotia-
tions were attempted could rule out important cases where the belligerents knew that negotiations would
have no chance for success and therefore did not even try. Second, a number of hypotheses (such as
duration of war, battle deaths, divisibility, and identity) predicted successful settlement based on condi-
tions that occurred during all wars, not simply during negotiations. Given this, I considered it necessary to
look at all forty-one cases  rst and then perform subsequent secondary analysis on the seventeen cases
where negotiations occurred. In this way I controlled for both types of selection bias.
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.783; p 5 .000).Again, in every case in which a guarantee was offered, the two sides
managed to reach and implement a lasting negotiated settlement.When no guarantee
was offered, negotiationsalmost always broke down. Second, it became clear that the
conditions necessary for negotiations to begin were not the same as the conditions
necessary for negotiationsto succeed.Whereas the duration of war and its magnitude
(battle deaths per one thousand population) were signi cantly correlated with the
outcome of the war when all forty-one cases were analyzed, when the seventeen
cases of negotiationswere analyzed separately these costs no longer had any signi -
cant effect on the ultimate success of these talks (r 5 .019, p 5 .942 for duration; and
r 5 .016, p 5 .959 for magnitude). This suggests that duration and magnitude might
have encouraged leaders to begin negotiations, but once talks began these ‘‘costs’’
were not enough to ensure  nal success. Third, military stalemate proved the only
variable other than security guarantees that helped predict successful outcome in
cases where negotiationoccurred (r 5 .491; p 5 .045). In short, when the hypotheses
were tested against the subset of seventeen cases experiencing negotiations, it be-
came clear that high costs were a necessary condition for negotiations to begin, but
security guarantees (to a greater extent) and military stalemate (to a lesser extent)
were then necessary for these talks to succeed.
Why does a stalemate seem to affect the success of negotiations? I would argue
that stalemates impart important information to groups nervous about their future.
Table 4. Possible causes of civil war settlement (seventeen civil wars with
negotiations, 1940–90; Pearson correlation coeffõcient analysis)
Independent variable
Outcome (victory or settlement)a
r Signicance (p)
Security guarantee .783 .000**
Costs
Duration .019 .942
Stalemate .491 .045*
Magnitude .016 .959
Intensity 2 .465 .109
Divisibility
Goals .022 .935
Population/resource distribution 2 .051 .847
Mediation 2 .056 .832
Identity
Ethnic .044 .868
Religious .312 .225
aOutcome is coded 1 for successful negotiated settlement and 0 for decisive victory.All the indepen-
dent variables are coded so that a positive relationship conforms to the hypothesis.
**p , .01 (two-tailed).
*p , .05.
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Military stalemates indicate that opponents are fairly evenly matched and cannot be
easily overpowered. They also indicate a defensive advantage in the military contest.
During these times groups are well-prepared to defend against attack, and this makes
both successful aggression and surprise attack unlikely. Finally, stalemates also tend
to bestow relatively equal bargaining power on the adversaries and thus promise a
more equal distribution of power in any new government. Each of these conditions
seems to create additional con dence in the long-term viability of an agreement and
helps reduce fears of future exploitation.53
The second test also corroborated the strong link between security guarantees and
successful settlement. The Uganda Peace Accord of December 1985 created a new
national army, divided leadership positions in the military council between the gov-
ernment and the rebels, and called for further political power sharing. Having re-
solved these tricky military and political issues, one would have expected this accord
to  ourish without the need for additional security guarantees; all the terms of the
accord were in place. But security guarantees were crucial to both the  nal accep-
tance and the subsequent failure of the treaty. Kenya, Tanzania, Britain, and Canada
were asked to establish a peacekeeping force to monitor the cease- re, but Britain
and Canada declined to participate. As a result, the terms were never implemented.
Chad’s ReconciliationAccord followed a similar pattern. Signed in August 1979, it
called for the demilitarizationof the capital, a general amnesty, a broad-based transi-
tional government, and the dissolution of all armed forces. A neutral peacekeeping
force from Guinea, Benin, and Congo was promised to enforce the cease- re. This
case is interesting because the government of ‘‘national unity’’ was actually estab-
lished in November 1979. Unfortunately, the neutral African force did not arrive
when scheduled, and no other terms were ever implemented. The new government
broke down by March 1980, and the war resumed until the guerrillas eventually won
a decisive victory seven years later. The importanceof enforcement, therefore, should
not be underrated. In most cases, adversaries were far more intransigent about basic
security issues during the transition period than they were over multiparty rule, land
reform, or majority rule. In many cases negotiationsfollowed the same timetable: the
political and economic issues were settled  rst, followed by the security arrange-
ments. These were usually the  nal and most difficult issues to work out.
The strong evidence offered for the importance of third-party security guarantees
and against the divisibility, identi cation, and mediation hypotheses suggests that a
uniquely intense security dilemma really does hinder negotiation in civil wars. As
many people have argued, adversaries are encouraged to bargain when the costs of
continuing to  ght become prohibitive. Yet high costs are not enough to convince
them to sign a highly risky settlement without added assurances from the outside.
Ultimately, it was the outside security guarantees that convinced these adversaries to
sign.
53. For an excellent discussion on the effects of the distribution of power on settlement, see Wagner
1994.
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Conclusions
The empirical results presented in this article are striking: between 1940 and 1990
enemies in civil wars almost always failed to reach successful negotiated solutions to
their con icts unless an outside power guaranteed the safety of the belligerents dur-
ing the ensuing transition period. This fact offers very strong support for the credible-
commitment theory of civil war resolution. Adversaries seem unable to credibly
promise to abide by the terms of a treaty that by its very nature offers enormous
rewards for cheating and enormous costs for being cheated upon. The results of the
study also offered some support for the cost-bene t hypothesis of war termination.
The duration and magnitude of a war did seem to affect the onset of negotiations,and
a military stalemate did seem to in uence when these negotiationswould then suc-
ceed.
What implications do these  ndings have for international relations theory? The
fact that both identity and the divisibilityof stakes have no effect on either the desire
to negotiate or the success of negotiations is a blow to those who believe that ethnic
con icts act fundamentally differently from other types of internal war and therefore
require more drastic solutions, such as partition. Not only does ethnicity not appear
to be an issue in whether or not adversaries will compromise, but partition also
appears to be a particularly unacceptable solution for incumbent governments. This
 nding should temper claims that ‘‘ethnic’’ con icts can only be resolved by dividing
groups into separate, homogeneous regions. On the other hand, the weakness of the
mediation hypothesiswarns against relying too strongly on skilled diplomacy as the
best way to help end civil wars. Mediation might be relatively cheap and easy, but
simply providing better information and better lines of communication between do-
mestic enemies does not appear sufficient to overcome severe security dilemmas.
Without corresponding security guarantees, mediation cannot convince groups to
implement treaties.
The signi cance of outside enforcement in civil war resolution, however, says
much about group behavior in competitive situations. First, security dilemmas can
emerge in any anarchic situation, even at the substate level and even for short amounts
of time. Its damaging effects are not limited to states in the international system. In
fact, in the face of a completely anarchic transition period, incumbent governments
and rebels act exactly like states in the international system: they resist collective
security and rely instead on their own self-help systems.
Second, although groups react similarly to the conditions of anarchy, this study
also reveals that groups are not equally able to control its divisive effects. The situa-
tion in which anarchy emerges greatly affects the probability for successful coopera-
tion. If groups can reduce their vulnerability and use strategies of reciprocity to
enforce compliance, then cooperationwill have a far greater chance to prosper. Yet if
groups cannot do this, they will  nd it virtually impossible to design credible treaties
without outside assistance.
Third, the relationship between the strength of security guarantees and internal
power-sharing arrangements indicates the importance of institutions for the long-
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term success of any peace agreement. Security might have been the most immediate
problem governments and rebels faced when attempting to end their wars, but ulti-
mately they cared greatly about future political arrangements. Thus, it seems both
security guarantees and institutional arrangements for power sharing were necessary
to ensure stable and durable settlements. In the end, both outside enforcement and
inclusive institutionsappear necessary for civil wars to end short of decisive military
victories. While enforcement is crucial to the short-term implementation of a peace
treaty, especially under conditions of severe helplessness, institutions and creative
constitutional contracts are crucial for long-term success. Thus, a mixture of force
and institutionsprovides the desired outcome: long-term peace.
Implications
Although even the best quantitative research is never sufficient to make decisions in
complex, real-world situations, the  ndings presented in this article could offer im-
portant guidelines to policymakers searching for effective ways to help end civil
wars.
First, and most importantly, the only type of peacekeeping that appears to help end
a war is that which is backed by a promise to use force. Observers or unarmed
peacekeepers with no military backup will have little positive effect on either nego-
tiations or treaty implementation. In fact, these ‘‘traditional’’ peacekeeperswill most
likely be placed in unstable situations prone to spiral back into violence. Even in the
most promising situation—for example, when belligerents have signed a detailed
peace agreement—the war will most likely resume, and unarmed peacekeepers will
suffer.
Second, if a state wishes to limit its involvement or share responsibility by work-
ing through a multilateral organization, it will be much more difficult to make a
credible commitment to enforce the settlement, and this type of involvement will
more likely fail to foster an agreement. A guarantee will only be as effective as the
political will of its backers. Thus, any hesitation or wavering by member states will
signal irresolution to the already anxious adversaries and ultimately undermine en-
forcement operations.
Third, the historical record also indicates that successful guarantors should be
willing to stay through the establishment of the new government and a new national
army. Intervention will have little effect on facilitating a long-term settlement if a
state remains involved only through the signing of a peace treaty. If a state ends its
involvement prematurely, it cannot perform the necessary function of enforcing the
treaty, and the settlement will fall apart. Negotiations should be viewed as the begin-
ning of the peace process, not the end.
Fourth, strict neutrality by the third party also does not appear necessary. The
outside guarantor in most cases was not a wholly unbiased participant, yet this did
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not seem to reduce their effectiveness.54 In fact, the Zimbabwe case suggests that
when an enormous power disparity exists between the adversaries, a somewhat bi-
ased third party in favor of the minority group can actually enhance feelings of
security. The fact that Britain was viewed as prejudiced in favor of the white Rhode-
sians seems to have increased white con dence in their own survival.
Another surprising  nding was the negative effect disarmament had on adversar-
ies’ sense of security. Rather than reassure former adversaries that they would not be
attacked during the transition period, the demand to disarm actually increased their
fear of attack. In most cases, adversaries had no illusions about their former enemy’s
ability to hide or procure weapons if they so chose. Allowing each side to retain
observable weapons enhanced their feelings of security and made them more likely
to follow through with treaty promises.
Sixth, a striking implication of this study is that alternatives do exist to prolonged
and extensive intervention;under certain conditions,outside states can avoid commit-
ting large numbers of forces to a foreign country and still facilitate cooperation.
Fewer enforcement troopswill be needed if extensive internal power-sharing arrange-
ments have been designed and all parties are guaranteed an effective voice in the new
government. If, however, one side can easily be shut out of power (as might happen
in winner-take-all elections or peace treaties that leave future political arrangements
vague or unde ned), a stronger force will be required for such settlements to suc-
ceed. In short, limited security guarantees can be offset by more detailed internal
arrangements, but even the most detailed political plans will require at least some
type of outside guarantee.
Finally, two additional points should be emphasized. First, security guarantees are
a necessary, not a sufficient condition for settlement. Guarantees in the face of an
ongoing war where the combatants have no desire to negotiate are unlikely to suc-
ceed. States wishing to facilitate early solutions to civil wars must wait until the
groups themselves desire peace before their promises of enforcement will have any
positive effect. Second, one should keep in mind that negotiated settlements are not
always the least costly solutions to civil wars since the rapid victory of one side over
another can bring fewer casualties and longer peace over the long run. Nonetheless,
some battles are clearly worth  ghting for, as Lincoln’s struggle against the U.S.
South attests. In short, settlements do have the potential to put an end to enormous
suffering, and negotiation sends an important message to the Milosevicsof the world
that internal aggression will not always be ignored by the international community.
Moreover, compromise settlements offer a chance to institute multiparty democratic
states in situations that might otherwise result in one-party authoritarian regimes.
Negotiations during times of civil war, therefore, could be viewed as moments of
great opportunity rather than as futile attempts to create collaborative regimes.
History, therefore, offers good and bad news to the international community. The
good news is that outside intervention can end potentiallybloody civil wars provided
the intervening state is committed to guaranteeing the peace treaty and the two war-
54. This argument is also made by Betts 1994.
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ring parties are in favor of a settlement. The bad news is that nonmilitary interven-
tion, although politically more acceptable and  nancially less costly, is unlikely to
accomplish much. It may provide a temporary solution, but it does not address the
more fundamental issue of insecurity. It may stay the bloodshed temporarily, but, by
de nition, such intervention cannot enforce a peace, since maintaining any settle-
ment and rebuilding a stable community occur only after a war is over. Outside
powers can play a critical role in the resolution of civil wars, but only if they are
willing to make a solid commitment and bear the necessary costs.
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